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e-Science projects face a difficult challenge in providing access to valuable 
computational resources, data and software to large communities of distributed users. On 
the one hand, the raison d’être of the projects is to encourage members of their research 
communities to use the resources provided.  On the other hand, the threats to these 
resources from online attacks require robust and effective security to mitigate the risks 
faced. This raises two issues: ensuring that (1) the security mechanisms put in place are 
usable by the different users of the system, and (2) the security of the overall system 
satisfies the security needs of all its different stakeholders. A failure to address either of 
these issues can seriously jeopardise the success of e-Science projects. 
 
The aim of this paper is to firstly provide a detailed understanding of how these 
challenges can present themselves in practice in the development of e-Science 
applications. Secondly, this paper examines the steps that projects can undertake to 
ensure that security requirements are correctly identified, and security measures are 
usable by the intended research community.  The research presented in this paper is based 
on four case studies of e-Science projects. Security design traditionally uses expert 
analysis of risks to the technology and deploys appropriate countermeasures to deal with 
them. However, these case studies highlight the importance of involving all stakeholders 
in the process of identifying security needs and designing secure and usable systems.  
 
For each case study, transcripts of the security analysis and design sessions were analysed 
to gain insight into the issues and factors that surround the design of usable security. The 
analysis concludes with a model explaining the relationships between the most important 
factors identified. This includes a detailed examination of the roles of responsibility, 
motivation and communication of stakeholders in the ongoing process of designing 
usable secure socio-technical systems such as e-Science. 
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1 Introduction 
e-Science projects aim to provide useful scientific services (such as computational 
resources or easy access to large amounts of data) in a distributed environment. One of 
the biggest challenges e-Science projects face is to make valuable assets (high-end computing power, storage capacity and bandwidth, and the data and software they 
contain) available to a large - potentially globally - distributed community of legitimate 
users, and at the same time protect those assets from unauthorised use and undesirable 
consequences.  
The challenge of designing security that is effective but usable is not unique to e-Science.  
Research into usable security over the past 10 years (e.g. [Adams & Sasse, 1999; Whitten 
& Tygar, 1999]) has demonstrated that users actively avoid security mechanisms that are 
difficult to use, and/or make mistakes that undermine security. Resolving this challenge is 
particularly relevant for e-Science which aims to bring different communities of users 
together, whilst maintaining a secure environment. 
 
There is thus a need in e-Science for both usability and security for the following reasons: 
1.  To attract and retain users from the target research communities, the system needs 
to offer resources that are perceived as valuable, however these resources are also 
of value to a range of attackers.  
2.  The security needs of stakeholders contributing or sharing resources must be met, 
or else they will not provide these resources. 
3.  At the same time, the system must be usable and accessible to the target research 
community, i.e. the security mechanisms that protect resources must not be so 
onerous that they deter researchers.  
e-Science projects should therefore consider the security needs and capabilities of all its 
various different stakeholders in a bid to address the issues of both usable and effective 
security.  
 
The biggest problem in achieving this is a lack of guidance for designing secure and 
usable software systems. As a means of addressing this we have previously presented 
AEGIS, a secure socio-technical system design method aiming at achieving usable 
security in software systems. As part of its ongoing design and validation, AEGIS was 
empirically applied in four e-Science projects. More details can be found in [Flechais, 
Mascolo et al, 2006; Flechais, Sasse et al, 2003; Sasse & Flechais, 2005]. 
 
The empirical application of AEGIS in security design sessions with e-Science projects 
provided an opportunity to explore the issues surrounding usable security design in 
greater detail. Most e-Science projects are expected to operate in a distributed setting, and 
many are also being developed in a distributed environment, through a consortium of 
different parties (for example laboratories, universities, and private companies). In 
practice, this has led to a number of problems which fall in two main categories: 
1.  Designing and devising secure systems that are usable by widely distributed user 
groups. 
2.  Overcoming the difficulties that arise out of having a development team that is 
geographically spread out. 
 
The research presented in this paper aims to provide knowledge about the factors and 
issues that surround the practical design of usable security. Based on the analysis of the 
real-world application of AEGIS to four e-Science projects, we describe the lessons 
learnt from these case studies. Key findings are the importance of assigning responsibility of security, making security requirements explicit to motivate all stakeholders to take 
their share of responsibility, and the importance of clear communication about security 
between different stakeholders. We analysed the transcripts of the studies in detail and 
present a model and description of the general factors and issues that were identified 
during security design. A review of the background literature in usable security design 
can be found in section 2, followed by a description of the research methodology adopted 
and studies conducted in section 3. Section 4 presents the analysis of the results, followed 
by a discussion of their relevance to secure system design in section 5. 
 
2 Background 
In an effort to achieve best practice, many e-Science applications have been developed 
following rigorous software engineering processes. In principle, software engineering 
provides all the tools and the techniques necessary to build systems that fulfil customer 
expectations, including security. However in practice, the continuing high number of 
security incidents in industry [Department of Trade and Industry, 2006], coupled with an 
increasing amount of research that shows that security is not well-suited to human factors 
[Adams & Sasse, 1999], indicates that current software engineering practices are not 
enough. 
 
2.1  Information Systems Security 
In the field of information systems security, a small number of security design 
approaches, called “integrative approaches” by [Siponen, 2001] attempt to consider 
organisational needs. These include responsibility modelling (Structures of 
Responsibility [Backhouse & Dhillon, 1996], and abuse cases [McDermott & Fox, 
1999]), a managerial approach to systems risk [Straub & Welke, 1998] or security 
modifications to existing information systems development methods [Hitchings, 1996; 
James, 1996]. 
 
Whilst these approaches provide some means of addressing user issues in security, they 
do not solve completely the problem of developing secure and usable software systems. 
They either do not integrate seamlessly into the development cycle (forcing developers 
into tools, models and techniques they may not know or wish to adopt) or fail to address 
issues of development duality – the problem of developing security separately from 
functionality. In addition to this, “… explanations come enshrouded in complexity, 
largely because of the sophisticated sociological and philosophical bases, and as a result 
the audience for such security approaches remains just a small group of academic 
researchers.” [Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001] 
Finally, little is known about the dynamics or the factors that surround the application of 
these methods, which could improve current practice and inform future research.  2.2 Human  Computer  Interaction and Security 
The research discipline of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) is now well-established, 
with multiple conferences and publications dedicated to the subject. Central to HCI is the 
concept of human factors and how these affect and shape how people react to computer 
systems. Human factors typically refer to the intrinsic properties of people, such as short-
term memory, visual acuity or physical dexterity but they can also refer to more systemic 
and organisational issues such as cultural and social effects. These properties can strongly 
influence the design of a system, most visibly at the interface level, but also at a more 
fundamental level such as the underlying model of operation of the system.  
 
In the field of computer security, the importance of human factors was first voiced in 
1975 when the notion of psychological acceptability [Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975] was 
proposed as a desirable property for computer protection mechanisms. The idea presented 
in that paper was later taken up by [Zurko & Simon, 1997], who argued for user-centred 
security design to ensure that users, developers and system administrators made correct 
decisions. Studies of existing security mechanisms, such as passwords [Adams & Sasse, 
1999] or PGP [Whitten & Tygar, 1999], also highlighted the important role that users 
play in the overall success of secure systems. As a consequence of this growing research, 
the new field of Human Computer Interaction in Security (HCISec) has become 
increasingly recognised. 
 
To date, most the research in HCISec has largely focused on users (such as examining 
passwords, security visualisation or encryption mechanisms). Unfortunately, assisting 
developers in designing usable security, as identified by Zurko & Simon, has not been the 
focus of much attention. Neither have the wider systemic issues of designing usable 
security been explored significantly. 
 
Current HCISec design techniques fall into two categories: design guidelines and 
usability evaluations of secure systems. 
 
A set of user interaction design guidelines for secure systems was proposed [Ka-Ping, 
2002]. Some examples of these guidelines are:  
“Path of Least Resistance. The most natural way to do any task should also be the 
most secure way.  
Appropriate Boundaries. The interface should expose, and the system should 
enforce, distinctions between objects and between actions along boundaries that 
matter to the user. 
Revocability. The interface should allow the user to easily revoke authorities that 
the user has granted, wherever revocation is possible.” 
Whilst these guidelines are useful as a reminder to developers to consider user needs, 
they do not tell them how to achieve these aims. The revocability guideline, for example, 
specifies that users should be able to easily revoke authorities – which is a very important 
part of the security of the system – but not how to achieve this. The guideline leaves this 
as a problem the developer should resolve. In terms of helping in the design of usable and secure systems, these guidelines only state 
desirable properties that may (or may not) apply to any particular system. 
 
At present, the only effective means of ensuring that a secure system is usable is to 
periodically conduct evaluations and test user responses. As can be seen from the PGP 
usability evaluation [Whitten & Tygar, 1999], this is useful as a means of uncovering 
problems. One major issue with this is that as a design practice it has no prescriptive 
value, and therefore does not inform developers about how to achieve a usable and secure 
design. 
An additional problem is that designing, conducting and interpreting an evaluation 
currently requires specialist knowledge. Whilst in the field of HCI this is common 
practice, this knowledge is not widespread in the security community and this poses an 
additional difficulty. 
2.3  Developing Usable Secure Systems 
A usable secure system design method must reconcile both social and technical aspects of 
the system with the goal of assuring that desirable interactions are actually carried out 
and undesirable interactions are prevented, detected, reacted to, deterred or avoided. 
 
AEGIS [Flechais, Sasse et al, 2003] was formulated as a software engineering process to 
guide the elicitation of requirements, identification of risks to the system and selection of 
countermeasures. Since the process is designed to fit into a normal software engineering 
development process, this addresses the issues identified above (section 2.1) such as 
development duality or unfamiliar tools. In addition to this, AEGIS also aims to achieve 
usable security through: 
1.  Participative design. This involves including users and other stakeholders in 
design, and follows from the seminal research of Enid Mumford and her 
colleagues [Mumford, 1983; Mumford & Weir, 1979]. It has been frequently 
argued that participation in information system design is very important to the 
success of a system [Barki & Hartwick, 1989; Mumford, 1983; Mumford & Weir, 
1979; Rousseau, 1989; Tait & Vessey, 1988; Wong, 1994]. Studies [Butler & 
Fitzgerald, 1997; Irestig, Eriksson et al, 2004; Wong, 1994] of participative 
design practices, such as the ETHICS method (Effective Technical and Human 
Implementation of Computer-based Systems) [Mumford, 1983], suggest that 
whilst user involvement does not guarantee a successful system design, the use of 
a participative approach does foster a climate that is conducive to successful 
development, and can also lead to more pragmatic designs [Irestig, Eriksson et al, 
2004]. 
The key element of participative approaches revolves around representing the 
relevant viewpoints of different parties in such a manner as to achieve a 
consensus. 
2.  Contextual modelling. Based on the contextual design approach [Beyer & 
Holtzblatt, 1998], AEGIS uses a modelling notation that allows the representation 
of the system and its users in their environment. The core principle of contextual 
design is to gain a detailed understanding of the needs and working practices of customers and other stakeholders in the system. This then supports developers in 
building systems that integrate well into the working environment of the user. 
2.4 Summary 
Software engineering approaches to security are generally focussed on providing 
technical security, but there is growing evidence [Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975] that these 
approaches do not consider the needs of people sufficiently [Zurko & Simon, 1997]. 
Although developers have been identified as being a target group that requires usable 
security [Zurko & Simon, 1997], no efforts seem to have been made to ensure security 
development methods are well suited to the needs of developers. In fact, by putting the 
onus on the developers to build better user interfaces, the current trend in HCISec 
research is arguably adding to the complexity of building secure systems. And whilst 
interpretive security approaches (see section 2.1) have started to address the needs for a 
socio-technical approach to secure systems, they are still falling short in providing a 
practical and relatively simple means for developers to achieve this. 
Consequently AEGIS was developed and empirically tested as a means of addressing the 
complex problem of achieving usable security design. As will be seen in the following 
case studies, this type of approach proved particularly useful in e-Science as a means of 
identifying the security needs of different stakeholders, and also in designing mechanisms 
that would be suited to the intended users. 
3 Case  Studies 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of security and usability needs in e-Science, we 
conducted 4 case studies with e-Science projects. Whilst the primary purpose of the case 
study was to trial the AEGIS process, the case studies also provided a detailed source of 
empirical data on the design of e-Science systems, and their security requirements. 
Details of the methodology employed in conducting the case studies and analysing the 
results are presented next. 
3.1 Methodology 
3.1.1 Action  Research 
Interventionist research approaches, such as action research, are well suited to empirical 
security research [Baskerville, 1999]. For example, they can benefit the participating 
organisations by actively intervening and improving on specific problems within the 
organisation. This promise of immediate assistance seems to be much more persuasive in 
gaining organisational interest than “… altruistic arguments about how (the) research 
might benefit software engineers generally” [Butler, 2000]. As a means of both 
elaborating and validating a usable secure system design method, action research was 
adopted as the research methodology. 
 
The intervention methodology (AEGIS) is a participative design method aimed at 
reconciling security, usability and software engineering good practice. The participation of stakeholders in the system design, together with the modelling of the users and 
operating context of the system are key elements of AEGIS for addressing the social 
aspects of secure system design. The process of AEGIS identifies security needs by 
modelling assets and attributing values to these according to security properties (such as 
confidentiality, integrity or availability). A risk analysis is then conducted to identify the 
most important areas of the system. Finally, security countermeasures are proposed based 
on these risks, cost and an assessment of their ease of use in the context of operation. 
More details can be found in [Flechais, Mascolo et al, 2006; Flechais, Sasse et al, 2003; 
Sasse & Flechais, 2005]. 
3.1.2 Grounded  Theory 
In contrast to these previous publications, the research presented in this paper does not 
focus on the outcomes of the intervention methodology, but rather on the detailed 
analysis of the transcripts of the design sessions, as a means of learning more general 
lessons about the design of usable security in e-science projects. This analysis was 
conducted using grounded theory; a theory building analysis methodology which has 
proven useful in gaining a better understanding of security issues, such as those 
surrounding users’ perceptions of privacy in multimedia communications [Adams & 
Sasse, 2001]. 
 
According to [Martin & Turner, 1986], grounded theory is "… an inductive, theory 
discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the 
general features of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical 
observations or data." Since grounded theory is a theory-building qualitative analysis 
tool, it is argued to be particularly suitable for areas in which a detailed description or 
understanding of the phenomenon does not exist.  
The main analytical process of grounded theory consists of taking data, breaking it down, 
conceptualising it and reassembling it into new forms. The end result of the analysis is a 
theory that explains and is based on the data. 
 
3.1.3  Research Approach  
AEGIS was applied to four projects – EGSO, CLEF, BioSimGrid and DCOCE – with a 
total of eight workshops conducted. Each workshop lasted between two and three hours, 
was recorded and transcribed in full. These interventions showed AEGIS to be a useful 
methodology and also provided useful feedback for improving the method (see [Flechais, 
Mascolo et al, 2006; Flechais, Sasse et al, 2003] for more details about the specific case 
studies). 
 
An overview of each case study will now be presented together with the most important 
issues that were uncovered, followed in section 4 by the grounded theory analysis of the 
transcripts of these studies. 
 3.2  European Grid for Solar Observations (EGSO) 
3.2.1 Overview 
The EGSO project is run by a consortium of different global partners (including among 
others British, French, Italian and American institutions), with a heavy emphasis on 
academic participation. EGSO is funded under the Information Society Technologies 
(IST) thematic programme of the European Commission's Fifth Framework Programme. 
The project is one of many partners from across Europe that co-operate through the EU 
GRIDSTART initiative. [EGSO, 2005] 
 
The purpose of EGSO is to provide a Grid making the solar observations of a number of 
different observatories and institutions available to customers, scientists in particular. 
EGSO is intended to operate as a virtual observatory, providing a platform through which 
scientists can access solar observation data from around the world. In addition to 
providing access to solar data, EGSO also intends to provide a distributed computation 
service for analysing the data. 
 
The case study involved three stakeholders: two developers from EGSO and one 
manager. This manager was a researcher himself, and thus part of the intended user 
community of EGSO.  
3.2.2 Issues  Uncovered 
Security Requirements 
During the study it became apparent that the project had very competent software 
engineers, and that a rigorous software engineering approach was applied to EGSO. This 
could be seen in documented use cases, requirements validation, user interface design and 
UML system design. The need for security had been acknowledged and some use cases, 
albeit in vague terms, described the need for some security mechanisms (e.g. the need for 
“direct access to satellite data in near real-time, perhaps only with necessary 
authorisation”).  
 
When first asked about security, however, the participants stated that “no one is in 
charge of security”. As with many e-Science projects, EGSO was developed by a variety 
of geographically distributed stakeholders. As a result of this, communication and 
coordination between different stakeholders is restricted, reducing the chance of 
opportunistic, informal interactions – a phenomenon that has been dubbed the ‘water 
cooler effect’ [Gorlenko, 2005]. In more centralised development environments, this 
might be a way of raising security issues and eventually bringing them to the fore, but in 
a distributed development project, discussions are more likely to stick to a pre-defined 
agenda. One critical means of making sure that security is not overlooked is to ensure a 
clear assignment of responsibility for the achievement of specific outcomes. This issue 
will be examined in more detail in sections 4.2 & 4.3. 
 It was also stated that security had not been considered in depth because the project was 
“still in (the) early stages (of) going from requirements to design”. Another comment 
justified a lack of concern for security by insisting that functionality was much more 
important at this time, and that security would be addressed later. In this case, security 
was considered as a non-functional requirement and the decision to address security at a 
later stage is a good example of development duality [Siponen & Baskerville, 2001]. 
 
Prior to our intervention, the only security requirement identified in EGSO was 
confidentiality (the property of security that concerns unauthorised disclosure of 
information) and access control, while other important requirements such as availability 
(the property of security that concerns unauthorised withholding of information) and 
integrity (the property of security that concerns unauthorised modification of 
information) had been overlooked. 
After the participants had been asked to identify key assets and review a number of attack 
scenarios, security requirements for availability and integrity quickly emerged. For 
example, the scenarios in which the data that was assumed to be public could be modified 
to suit a particular attacker, where user software running through a user executable code 
service could be used to attack the system, or where a third party gained access to a user’s 
personal space. The impact of these particular attack scenarios on stakeholders ranging 
from the users (scientists) to the data providers (solar observatories) demonstrated the 
importance of these additional requirements. Indeed it quickly became apparent that 
confidentiality was only a marginally important requirement when compared to integrity 
and availability. 
Understanding of Security 
The design sessions uncovered inaccuracies in the understanding of security technology 
for example, the notion that middleware would “take care of the PKI” (Public Key 
Infrastructure) in a digital certificate scheme. The underlying assumption in this 
statement being that a PKI only requires the design of software. But a PKI, as the 
acronym describes, is a security infrastructure that involved users actively being issued 
with digital certificates and having to manage these. It is thus also necessary for the social 
elements of the infrastructure to be designed and implemented. 
The assumption made was a convenient one, motivated by a desire to avoid having to use 
digital certificates. The justification was another assumption: that only a few users would 
need access to sensitive computing services. However, a more detailed inspection of use 
cases revealed that, although few users needed access to these computational facilities, 
other aspects of the system (such as personal user spaces) were also at risk and required 
strong authentication. 
The desire to avoid using digital certificates was as a result of their perceived excessive 
costs, such as poor usability and the need to implement the necessary infrastructure and 
training. 3.3  Clinical e-Science Framework (CLEF) 
3.3.1 Overview 
The purpose of CLEF is to provide a framework through which clinical patient 
information can be accessed for the purposes of medical research. The “capture, 
integration, and presentation of descriptive information is a major barrier to achieving 
such a framework. Clinical histories, radiology and pathology reports, annotations on 
genomic and image databases, technical literature and Web based resources all typically 
originate as text. Often they are dictated and then typed; alternatively they are 
laboriously coded or annotated manually, usually in incompatible formats that lack 
rigour and hence cannot be scaled up or aggregated effectively.” [CLEF, 2004] Because 
of legal and ethical constraints placed on clinical research, one of the main areas of 
research for CLEF is in the areas of security, and how to preserve the confidentiality of 
patient information whilst achieving a useful research framework. The main mechanism 
being developed by CLEF involved the anonymisation of patient information as a means 
of protecting patient privacy. 
 
This case study involved two stakeholders from the project. Both had extensive 
experience in the field of medical research and were also security experts responsible for 
the security in CLEF. 
3.3.2 Issues  Uncovered 
Security Requirements 
One area of concern was the need for integrity in the data. The anonymisation process 
described by CLEF consisted of removing what they called directly identifiable 
information from the data: names, addresses and dates of birth of patients. The 
anonymisation process also consisted of coding the medical information held in the 
patient records into a standard format, further reducing the possible existence of directly 
identifiable data. This is a good example of a usability/security tradeoff, where the need 
for privacy of patient data is seen as being important enough to warrant reducing the 
amount of information available to the researchers. 
From the point of view of scientists, however, the question was how much this process of 
changing the records affected the integrity of that data, bearing in mind that the ultimate 
purpose of the data was to support clinical research. 
Since the project was designed to research issues such as this, the participants were not 
able to quantify the impact of this process; however they were able to present three 
reasoned arguments: 
1.  Clinical research cannot be conducted on data without first coding it in some 
fashion. Whilst the clinical coding does change the data, it is necessary to support 
any research. 
2.  This would only be critical if the data changed to the point where the conclusions 
drawn from its analysis would be different from those conducted on the 
identifiable data. It was argued that research methodologies allowed for some degree of variation in the data, and that therefore the changes to the data would be 
taken into account. 
3.  The purpose of CLEF is to provide a means of informing new clinical studies, as 
opposed to replacing them. Therefore the data provided by CLEF is intended as a 
means of facilitating the identification and specification of new research. 
 
The security requirements for privacy were not directly derived from patients, but instead 
imposed by legal precedent and ethics committees. Based on those guidelines, there 
should be no way to re-identify a patient (backtracking). However, user-centred research 
on privacy [Adams & Sasse, 2001] established that – unlike regulation – people do not 
seek to avoid all risks to privacy.  Rather, they balance risks against potential benefits.  
Thus, given appropriate safeguards, patients might want to benefit directly from new 
research results (such as for example research identifying new risk factors for diseases). 
However, because of the need for complying with a perceived level of confidentiality, 
this facility was disregarded.  
“I mean effectively, what we’re going to do, we recognise that backtracking could 
be valuable in certain cases, in many ways in order to get it adopted we’re saying 
we’re not going to have backtracking, we won’t have processes that allow 
backtracking, though technically, it might be possible. But as far as we’re 
concerned we’re not going to set up processes that are going to do that.” 
Understanding of Security 
A significant difference between the two case studies can be seen in the participants’ 
difference of awareness and knowledge of security. Whereas the participants in the 
EGSO case study were developers and managers, the CLEF participants were security 
experts. 
In addition to identifying requirements that were particularly important to certain 
stakeholders (such as the usefulness of backtracking for patients, or the importance of 
research integrity for scientists), questioning the design of the system also had the effect 
of conducting sanity checks against these requirements. 
In one instance the complexity and cost of the proposed system design was examined 
when rated against the needs of researchers and the privacy requirements of the patients 
providing the data.  
 
This cost-benefit discussion allowed the participants to seriously examine their design 
and justify it. This following quote illustrates this: 
“I thought about that very hard, and I felt that actually although it was very 
helpful that you prodded me in the direction, I actually thought no I actually think 
he's wrong and I'm right, and that we are right.” 3.4  Biological Simulation Grid (BioSimGrid) 
3.4.1 Overview 
“The aim of the BioSimGrid project is to make the results of large-scale computer 
simulations of biomolecules more accessible to the biological community. Such 
simulations of the motions of proteins are a key component in understanding how the 
structure of a protein is related to its dynamic function.” Since running these simulations 
is computationally expensive, they are currently performed by individual laboratories that 
have the resources to conduct this research. The purpose of this project is therefore to 
provide a data Grid of different simulations so that users will have a single point of 
access to this information. 
Two members of the project participated in the study and were able to represent both a 
developer and a system user point of view. It should be noted that both this study and the 
DCOCE study were substantially shorter and only involved one workshop each. 
3.4.2 Issues  uncovered 
People and Security 
The first point that arose in this study was that the security roles of operatives in a system 
are frequently overlooked, and technical security mechanisms are generally assumed to 
solve a security problem. Many of the administrative duties in the system, such as 
backup, patching, maintenance of the authentication mechanism (in this case based on 
SSL digital certificates, and a username and password combination for users who do not 
have certificates), and maintenance of the authorisation mechanism (role-based access 
control) were not initially apparent. 
 
Identifying these required detailed and probing questions, for example when the 
participants mentioned that the system was backed up (“who backs the system up? Is 
there a policy for when and what to backup?”), or that digital certificates were used to 
authenticate users (“How do users get a certificate?”, “Who do they apply to for access 
to the system?”).  Simply establishing that an administrator has to monitor, backup, and 
maintain the system – with little to no supervision or help – throws up a number of 
questions with regards to both the scalability of the system (can the tasks expected of the 
administrator be extended to cover one or two orders of magnitude more users?) and the 
effectiveness of the current system security (which in the absence of training, audit and 
documented policies is wholly dependent on the competence of the administrator – not on 
the technical countermeasures). 
Stakeholder Conflicts 
Issues of conflicting stakeholder requirements were also identified here. The question 
was asked: “How important is it for you to be able to keep this [simulation data] 
secret?” to which the answer was “we have no need for confidentiality… At the 
moment.” When questioned further, “from an academic user point of view, using your own words, how would you rate, how important would confidentiality be? Would it be 
low, unimportant, high, essential…” The answer was that the requirement for 
confidentiality was low, however from a pharmaceutical company’s point of view, the 
requirement for confidentiality was deemed to be medium to high in some cases. 
However since the system did not currently involve pharmaceutical companies, the 
current requirement was originally judged to be low. 
 
From a requirements point of view, capturing this information is important. On the one 
hand, the system as it is does not require that level of security, on the other, the system as 
envisioned in a future development may have a high requirement for this kind of security. 
Furthermore this also illustrates the need to identify and represent as many stakeholders 
in the system as possible to identify potentially conflicting viewpoints.  
With regards to security, it is very important to understand the need for a cost-benefit 
analysis of any security decision. The differences between the short and long-term 
security needs in the system do not necessarily have to cause serious difficulties. It is 
cheaper to compromise on a short-term implementation than it is to compromise on the 
long-term design. Any security mechanisms that have been designed but not implemented 
will be cheaper to implement at a later date than in a system where it is necessary to 
overhaul the original design.  
 
3.5 Digital Certificate Operation in a Complex Environment 
(DCOCE) 
3.5.1 Overview 
The DCOCE project is tasked with analysing the use of digital certificates and public key 
infrastructures (PKI) within the complex environment of Oxford University, with its 
(semi-) autonomous colleges and departments. The emphasis of the project is the use of 
X.509 digital certificates for authentication to services. It should be noted here that the 
purpose of the system is to provide a security infrastructure on which other services to 
users can be supplied. 
A total of four stakeholders participated in the study, and each represented a different 
point of view. These consisted of: 
•  The university point of view. The view of the organisation that owns and manages 
the project.  
•  A developer of DCOCE. The view from the principal developer of DCOCE 
•  A user of the system. The view from an academic who will use DCOCE as a 
means of pursuing research 
•  A data provider. The view of an organisation that provides access to its data based 
on the authentication of staff and students through DCOCE. 3.5.2 Issues  Uncovered 
Stakeholder Views of Security 
The study highlighted that issues of usability were of great concern, and the developer 
was keen to adopt a development approach that took stakeholder needs into account:  
“The decision to look into PKI [(was taken]) and we’re keen to go forward on 
that rightly or wrongly, and then we try and take it to our stakeholders and see 
how it fits and see what the needs are. So in a way we’re kind of forced to go 
down the route of PKI, but we’re trying to build something that will fit the 
stakeholders.” 
 
Some of the challenges facing this project were identified from the university 
representative, such as: 
 “(The need to) have a system that is usable by my set of users at the university, 
that vary hugely in terms of their knowledge of IT and knowledge of security and 
knowledge of computing generally. (…) It needs to be scalable so you’re issuing it 
to lots of new students that are arriving each year, so it’s got to be scalable and 
dynamic and something that you can manage and keep on top of. Obviously it 
mustn’t be too expensive, but that’s part of the scalability issue.” 
In addition to the user group, another important stakeholder group and their need for 
security was identified by asking what the performance measures of the system were: 
“Where the performance really comes in, in terms of you need something that is 
secure enough to be trusted by the data service providers, that they’re going to 
have faith in it, that it’s working, that we’re doing it properly. So we have to allow 
our users to access those resources, and for the data service providers to have 
confidence that our whole system is not so insecure that anyone in the UK or the 
world cannot get hold of credentials to log onto their system.” 
 
Thus, security was essential for ensuring the trust of the data providers, and also the 
reputation of the university. A further complication with regards to managing the system 
was discovered when a question was asked about the logistics of the subscriptions to data 
service providers: 
“Researcher: with the actual subscriptions with the data service providers, is it 
done on a university basis, or is it done on a more ‘by department basis’, so some 
departments would have access to these resources whereas others wouldn’t, or if 
one department has it, the others wouldn’t? 
University: That’s a very good question actually. Within Oxford, if you want to 
have access, there’s an agreement that you really should go through the systems 
and electronic resources department, so that these deals can be brokered like 
that. However one of the things that we were to find out was that there are some 
departments, there are some colleges that have got their own deals, so that was 
an interesting question for us. So yes they do do that.” Usable Security 
As has been stated, there was a need for ensuring that DCOCE provided usable security. 
The presence of a user in the case study provided a means of directly eliciting that 
stakeholder’s point of view. When asked about current organisational policies for 
security, the user responded that the policies varied depending on location and who was 
managing the computers. 
“Researcher: do you think that’s a good thing, different policies, or would you 
like to see one policy that covers everything? 
User: I’d like to see one policy that covers everything. Because I have to do 
different things according to where I am 
Researcher: So is there a central place within the university which dictates policy 
for security, or is it up to the individual departments to set their own 
User: it’s up to the different departments and colleges” 
Some usability information was uncovered by asking how much effort the user was 
willing to go to for the added security of the public key infrastructure of DCOCE: 
“User:I don’t want it to be any more difficult than it is already. 
Researcher: and how difficult is it 
User: Just username and password” 
It became clear that the priority of users is not security, but the ability to achieve their 
production tasks. This was further illustrated by the question: 
“what sort of frequency of password change would you find acceptable? 
User: oh, I never change my email password…” 
Despite this lack of interest in actively pursuing security, the user was asked to assess the 
impact that a malicious attack on their personal data would have, highlighting the need 
for effective security: 
“Researcher: so if somebody else got access to that data [user’s research 
website] and changed it, would it have any impact on you or the work that you 
do? 
User: it would probably affect my credibility 
Researcher: Would that impact maybe on the university or the department or an 
outside agency 
User: well if my credibility slips that means that other people don’t want to work 
or collaborate with me on research.” 
 
The following section presents the analysis of the case studies, together with a model of 
the factors that affect the design process of a usable and secure socio-technical system. 
4 Analysis 
The model described in this section is the result of the grounded theory analysis (see 
section  3.1.2) of the transcripts of the case studies described in section 3.2 - 3.5. 
Transcripts were initially coded using the hermeneutics analysis package ATLAS.ti. With 
the help of this tool, these codes were then organised into categories. The categories 
consisted of Motivation, Responsibility, Communication and Stakeholder. Because the findings from the analysis are too numerous to describe here, only the key points of 
interest from each category are presented in sections 4.2 - 4.5. 
 
The final stage of grounded theory analysis consists of organising these concepts around 
a central category, and creating a ‘storyline’ explaining the resulting theory. This 
storyline is presented in section 4.6, and describes the fundamental factors that influence 
a participative socio-technical approach to security design. Throughout the following, 
high-level categories are highlighted in bold and detailed sub-categories are presented in 
italics. 
4.1  Grounded Theory Model Semantics 
All the models presented in the grounded theory analysis were generated using ATLAS.ti 
and consist of network diagrams that relate the different categories identified. The 
semantics of the notation are as follows: 
•  == means is associated with 
•  => means is a cause of 
•  [] means is part of 
•  <> means contradicts 
A simple example of this is in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1: Example Grounded Theory Network Diagram 
This diagram means that a “legal constraint” is a cause of “responsibility”. 
 4.2 Responsibility 
 
Figure 2: Responsibility Model 
As shown in Figure 2,  responsibility for security is tightly linked with motivation, 
liability, and stakeholder security requirements. 
4.2.1 Boundaries  of  Responsibility and Control 
Identifying the roles of people in the system and the environment in which they operated 
generally led to the identification of boundaries: 
1.  of control 
2.  of responsibility 
“Researcher:(…) do you assume that there is an admin at each provider? 
Stakeholder3: yes it is assumed that there will be somebody who has the role of 
an admin, whether that is there… 
Stakeholder2: I believe they’re outside EGSO 
Stakeholder3: yes they’re outside EGSO 
Stakeholder2: they don’t have to know the nitty gritty 
Researcher: but you’re assuming that someone at the provider end is in charge of 
the resource and is capable of modifying access and things like that.” 
It is important to note that responsibility does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with 
control. In this example, since the provider administrators operated outside EGSO, they 
weren’t inside the control boundary of EGSO – i.e. the boundary within which a 
component (human or technical) can be made to behave in a specified manner. This led to 
the implication that they were also outside the security responsibility boundary (i.e. the 
boundary within which security should be addressed by the project) and therefore should 
not be included in the security design process. As seen here, the process of identifying 
these boundaries can also uncover some evidence of diffusion of responsibility. In situations where there is a lack of control over parts of the system, yet security has to 
be provided, the stakeholders expressed the need for making security as lightweight as 
possible. This can be seen as an indication that low security overheads and easy-to-use 
security mechanisms are important for situations where control (i.e. enforcement, 
monitoring, or auditing for example) is not possible. This is a key argument in favour of 
usable security since it provides a means of addressing the lack of control of security. 
4.2.2 Diffusion  of  Responsibility 
Another property of responsibility that has been identified is the propensity to assume 
that another party will or should take care of security. This is what social psychologists 
call diffusion of responsibility: the notion that everyone assumes that someone else will 
take care of a particular problem [Darley & Latané, 1970]. This has been identified at the 
system level through undocumented assumptions (e. g. that administrators will take care 
of maintaining access control lists, backup systems and perform special services). 
It has also, in some cases, been identified at the project level: 
•  Where lack of control over a component (as identified in section 4.2.1) leads to a 
reaction of avoiding the consideration of security for that component. 
•  Where some security issues are assumed to be the province of another party 
(namely governing bodies such as Gridstart, or the e-Science Security Task 
Force). For example, in order to use certificates in the system, a network of trust 
between certification authorities has to be in place.  
 “It really shouldn't be up to EGSO to establish this network of trust itself. It 
should be relying on people to certify people within countries and organisations.” 
As seen in this quote, the responsibility for setting this up and administering it was 
argued to be in the hands of a third party, possibly the governing bodies of the e-Science 
projects – but no discussion had arisen between the project and the governing bodies with 
regards to resolving this issue.  
It is important to note that diffusion of responsibility occurred only in areas where 
responsibility was not clearly assigned. In the case of CLEF, the legal and ethical 
frameworks ensured that the project took responsibility for security; therefore it is not 
surprising that there was no evidence of diffusion of responsibility at the project level in 
this study. 
4.3 Motivation 
 
Figure 3: Motivation Model  
During the studies, the motivation to apply security varied from enthusiastic to ‘not 
interested’. It was stated, for example, that security would be addressed once 
functionality was finished. In one study, this led to parts of the development team in the 
project that was not involved in the workshops ignoring any matters pertaining to security 
(even when part of the project was addressing security issues, the rest of the project 
tended to be completely uninterested, e.g. “He’s [the architect] not ‘all right, what’s been 
happening with the security, what’s coming out of it?’ do you know what I mean?”). 
 
A detailed analysis shown in Figure 3 describes all the factors that affect the motivation 
for security during the development process. These are: 
•  Responsibility 
•  Liability 
•  Reputation 
•  Trust 
•  Customer culture. 
Responsibility is a key motivator for addressing security. In the EGSO case study, the 
manager was keen to take responsibility for security (even though he was not explicitly 
given this responsibility) and facilitated and participated in the security design process. In 
the CLEF and DCOCE studies, responsibility for security was squarely with the 
participants and therefore strongly motivated them to address the issues. 
Liability is a refinement on the notion of responsibility in that it represents what a third 
party expects to be the responsibility of the project – not necessarily what the project 
recognises or accepts as their responsibility. Liability is a motivator for security in the 
sense that if the project were to facilitate or inadequately guard against an attack that 
damaged a stakeholders’ assets, the project would have to face a cost. This could be 
financial cost, but more importantly the reputation of the project would be affected. 
Safeguarding the reputation of the project is a particularly potent motivator for security, 
since the system depends on the goodwill of providers to operate. Should the project’s 
reputation become tarnished, it is possible that customers and users would no longer trust 
the system to run on their machines, thereby putting the whole survival of the project at 
risk. The need for safeguarding this trust is a strong motivating factor for addressing 
security. 
Finally, customer culture can also affect the motivation for security:  
“They (customers) want something that they can sit down and physically play 
with, rather than something which is presented on paper. (…) They’d be happy 
with code, whether it works or not, they’d be happier with seeing some code 
rather than seeing some abstract representation of some high-level app…” 
As illustrated by the quote, the customer culture in this case is perceived by the 
participants as placing a great deal of emphasis on achieving functioning prototypes as 
quickly as possible, without necessarily going through structured engineering approaches. 
The pressure is therefore put on the developers to provide functionality as quickly as 
possible, to the detriment of security. 4.4 Communication 
 
Figure 4: Communication Model 
Confusion 
Initially, participants required detailed explanation of the security concepts because of 
their extremely precise and abstract nature. During the discussion the differences between 
integrity, confidentiality and availability could become confusing, particularly after 
discussions had been ongoing for long periods of time.  
“Researcher: what about availability? Availability of this program. Judging from 
what you’ve said I don’t think that availability is that… 
Stakeholder2: should it not match the most important resources? 
Researcher: that’s an interesting question… I think it’s a bit beguiling, because 
we’re not seeing the picture as it is…. No no no I’m sorry my mistake, I think 
availability is high, is a very high level, you’re right… I’m just a bit confused.” 
This is made somewhat worse by the fact that dependencies between assets can link two 
different security concepts in two different assets. For example the integrity of server 
software can directly affect the availability of the data served by that machine, or the 
confidentiality of a user’s activities. 
Addressing issues of confusion, particularly for the purposes of eliciting the security 
requirements of each asset of the system, became very important. During the studies, the 
participants were finding it difficult to assess the importance of the security property of 
an asset (e.g. the integrity of server software), therefore the question was clarified by 
using a scenario in which this particular property was compromised and asking the 
participants to rate how damaging this would be to the system. 
 
The decision to use scenarios in the security requirements elicitation came from the 
observation that the communication of more complex security concepts throughout the case study generally took place in the form of anecdotes and scenarios which will be 
described in the following sections. 
The Need for Scenarios 
To overcome the complexity associated with abstract security concepts, scenarios were 
discussed extensively in the case studies. As well as being used to elicit security 
requirements, scenarios were used to propose potential threats, suggest design solutions 
and describe how these would behave. 
In more complex discussions, scenarios were also supported through the use of simple 
graphical representations (on a white board for example). These allowed the clarification 
of complex communications between different participants, and ensured that people did 
not talk at cross purposes. 
It should be noted that abuse cases [McDermott & Fox, 1999] are a form of documented 
scenario for the purposes of identifying security requirements. The difference here is that 
abuse cases are directly used to identify vulnerabilities by modelling attacks, whereas in 
this case scenarios are used to elicit information from the participants. As such these 
scenarios are not a security analysis tool like abuse cases, but a communication tool 
which then supports security analysis through the participation of others. Despite this 
difference, the notation employed by abuse cases (namely UML use cases) could easily 
be used to document scenarios. 
The Role of Anecdotes 
Knowledge about security is generally expressed in the form of anecdotes – either 
personal or vicarious stories. In the case studies, security anecdotes were used by 
participants to explain and justify the possibility or likelihood of a particular security 
problem. For example: 
“Stakeholder1: well yes again, X was telling me the other day that he's got some 
files that have vanished, and it’s because he was running a mirror. 
Stakeholder2: mirror? 
Stakeholder1: he had a mirror running that should have been stopped, somebody 
deleted some data at the other end, so his data disappeared as well because he 
had got the delete switch on. Now this is the problem with the, not necessarily 
with the administrator, directly doing something, but inadvertently they allowed a 
change in the system at the other end to affect the copy at your end.” 
Anecdotes about past attacks gathered from stakeholders who have experience in the 
field can also be a useful source of information. In the absence of other risk 
measurements, anecdotes can serve during the risk analysis as a means of informing the 
estimation of the likelihood of an attack occurring. Whilst this is not an ideal solution, it 
is frequently the case that there is no other information available on which to base this 
estimate. 4.5 Stakeholders 
 
Figure 5: Stakeholder Model 
4.5.1 Stakeholder  Viewpoint 
The biggest benefit of involving stakeholders in the security process was that it was 
possible to directly elicit their point of view. This provided very rich information about 
security needs, constraints and limitations that would be acceptable to the different 
stakeholders. As an example, other than lack of control, another factor driving the need 
for data providers to have easy-to-use security was the stated need for low buy-in. This 
was necessary in order for the project to secure as many providers as possible, thereby 
creating value in their system.  
It is interesting to note that even with a relatively small set of stakeholders participating 
in the process it is possible to identify points of view from a variety of other 
stakeholders as related through the participants. These points of view can serve as a 
basis for identifying the value of the security properties of the system’s assets. In EGSO 
for instance, it was initially stated that there was no need for confidentiality of the solar 
data. When asked about the point of view of the organisations supplying the data, it was 
identified that some solar data providers did have a requirement for temporarily ensuring 
the exclusive access to their data. 
4.5.2 Stakeholder  Knowledge 
Different stakeholders have different types of knowledge that are relevant to the system 
design: •  System knowledge 
•  Security knowledge 
Stakeholders have a different understanding about diverse areas of the system. 
Developers for instance are particularly focussed on the technical needs and possibilities 
of the system. System users are more interested and knowledgeable in the areas of 
application of the system and how the functionality provided will be useful. Using this 
knowledge in system development is traditionally the province of requirements 
elicitation, where the needs of the stakeholders are captured in order to inform the 
design of the system. 
Whilst it is typical in system development to gather functional requirements from 
stakeholders, security development tends to adopt a different approach. General 
approaches to security derive security requirements from checklists, risk assessments 
based on questionnaires or an analysis of the system in order to determine what security 
is necessary. This type of approach only makes use of security experts’ security 
knowledge, and whilst they have the most security knowledge of all the stakeholder 
groups of the system, they are not the only source of security knowledge or needs. The 
needs of users, data providers, administrators, and developers are also important for 
security. As such the knowledge of these other stakeholders is also particularly relevant 
in the identification of security requirements that reflect accurately what the 
stakeholders want. 
It is also important to realise that stakeholder knowledge of security can be limited or 
even flawed. Mistakes, preconceptions and misunderstandings can affect the direction of 
the discussion. As an example, a load balancing mechanism for EGSO was proposed as a 
means of addressing denial of service attacks. Although this mechanism would be useful 
under heavy but normal operation, it would not be particularly effective against a targeted 
attack. Stakeholder conflict (see section 4.5.4) can arise out of mistakes, however in the 
case of mistakes or misconceptions, this can usually be resolved through communicating 
the reasoning behind different positions. 
4.5.3  Stakeholder Security Awareness 
The only previous attempt to involve stakeholders directly in the security process has 
been reported by [James, 1996]. Involvement there was limited to the security planning 
of information security in an existing organisation – not in the development of a technical 
system.  
James found that awareness of security needs was raised after the involvement of the 
participants. In these case studies there is also evidence that involving stakeholders in 
this process has raised awareness. In the words of one participant who was paraphrasing a 
politician at the time: 
“… what [AEGIS] is doing is reducing the unknown unknowns and converting the 
unknown unknowns into known unknowns.” 
Essentially, the participative nature of the AEGIS process allowed the participants to 
become more aware of security issues which had previously not been known about. 4.5.4 Stakeholder  Conflicts 
This category serves to illustrate the cases when different stakeholders do not agree. In 
order to move on from conflicts, it becomes necessary to reach an understanding with the 
two (or more) stakeholders regarding the disagreement. Either the disagreement arises 
out of incomplete knowledge (such as ignorance of a particular threat, for example) or it 
arises out of genuinely differing but equally valid points of view. 
If these conflicts occur, they can usually be resolved after both sides have argued their 
position, and possible solutions can then be explored. And whilst situations where this 
fails to achieve a solution were not encountered in our studies, it is likely that they could. 
This would probably mean that both sides had equally valid viewpoints, and such a 
conflict would be very useful in uncovering a serious issue that might require a higher-
level strategic decision.  
 
4.6 Model of factors and issues in socio-technical security 
design in e-Science 
 
A model of these factors is presented in Figure 6. It should be noted that whilst these 
factors were identified from information gathered from the application of AEGIS, efforts 
were made to ignore the issues that were the direct result of AEGIS (for example 
modelling assets, or eliciting security requirements based on these assets). Instead the 
focus was put on identifying the general factors that affected the socio-technical security 
design process, thereby providing a better understanding of the more general act of 
designing security. Security Design 
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Figure 6: Grounded Theory Model of Socio-Technical Secure System Design 
 
The aim of security design is to create a system that is adequately protected from 
undesirable events in that system. It is important for the success of the security that 
relevant knowledge be present during the design process. This includes the need for 
accurate knowledge about: 
1.  the system 
2.  security practice 
Knowledge about the system refers to information that describes what the system is 
intended to do, how it should operate and any other information about the system relevant 
to the design of security. The best source for this information exists in the knowledge of 
stakeholders such as users, developers, system owners, system administrators, etc.  
Knowledge about security practice refers to security concepts and principles, the 
understanding of the need for security to be usable, insight into threats, vulnerabilities 
and risk, etc. This type of information exists in the knowledge of stakeholders such as 
security experts, but also as part of the security design process itself, which informs and 
directs the act of designing security. In the case studies, the AEGIS process provided 
some knowledge about security practice, whilst also recommending the involvement of security experts as a means of providing the essential knowledge gained through 
experience. 
 
Given that any stakeholder (for example a user or a security expert) has a degree of 
knowledge about both the system and security practice, the model does not distinguish 
between the extent and type of knowledge that different stakeholders have. 
 
In order to ensure that this knowledge is available, it is necessary for all the relevant 
stakeholders in the system to be identified and represented in the design process. These 
stakeholders include people who are more knowledgeable about the system – for 
example users, developers or administrators – and people who are more knowledgeable 
about security practice, namely security experts. This is particularly important for e-
Science which aims to bring many different stakeholders together in distributed 
environments and where the communication between stakeholders can be more limited. 
One of the best ways of achieving this representation is to ensure the participation of 
stakeholders in the process. However, each stakeholder has different security 
responsibilities (which range from significant in the case of security experts to very low 
in the case of some users) and various levels of motivation to address security needs. As 
was seen in one case study, this can result in certain stakeholders declining to participate 
in the security design, either through a perceived lack of responsibility (for example 
through diffusion of responsibility) or insufficient motivation (for example with the need 
to achieve functionality taking precedence). Despite this, ensuring that the relevant 
viewpoints of stakeholders in the system are represented in the security design is critical 
in making sure that the final design addresses the needs and requirements of these 
stakeholders. 
The issues of motivation and responsibility can also affect the security design process 
beyond determining whether stakeholders decide to participate or not. That is to say that 
issues of responsibility boundaries, in other words the perception of the limits of 
responsibility of a particular stakeholder, also limit the extent to which stakeholders 
decide to consider security needs. In practice, this can be seen when stakeholders decide 
not to address specific issues because they perceive the problem to be the responsibility 
of another party. The problem arises here when there is no communication between the 
two parties and both of them assume that the issue is the responsibility of the other 
(another instance of diffusion of responsibility). The distributed nature of many e-Science 
development environments hinders clear communications and makes such examples of 
diffusion of responsibility far more likely. 
 
The process of socio-technical security design is fundamentally a communication 
exercise between the different stakeholders in the system. Without effective 
communication the relevant design information – such as requirements, constraints or 
necessary discussions – would be impossible. As a result, the primary purpose of a socio-
technical security design process is as a means of facilitating this communication. 
  
The concept of communication was very strongly tied in practice to anecdotes and 
scenarios as means of expressing security knowledge and reasoning about security. 
Anecdotes were frequently used to communicate knowledge about real security issues. Scenarios, however, were even more widely used as a means of communicating security 
concepts, reasoning about security principles and justifying points of view. Given that 
participation in security design has not been extensively researched, it is useful to note 
the effectiveness of scenarios at communicating specific and detailed technical 
information to non-technical stakeholders (such as users). 
 
Successful communication requires that stakeholders share their knowledge and points 
of view with as little bias and as few misunderstandings or confusion as possible. This is 
necessary to ensure that the design process remains focussed on matters of security 
design, as opposed to having to address issues of semantics or other unrelated concerns. 
The aim is to ensure that stakeholder conflicts, in other words disagreements, are related 
to genuine and valid opposing points of view, as opposed to differences that arise out of 
miscommunications or confusion. Resolving these genuine disagreements is a key aspect 
of the act of designing security. 
5 Conclusions 
For e-Science, the need to devise security mechanisms that address stakeholder concerns, 
and are both effective and usable is a significant concern. As seen from the case studies, 
involving stakeholders in the design of security provides a very effective means of 
identifying their needs. In addition, the presence of stakeholders during security design 
also provides additional benefits in raising awareness and knowledge of security issues in 
the system. Finally, understanding stakeholders’ capabilities also facilitates the design of 
appropriate countermeasures, making the final system well-suited to its intended users. 
 
The grounded theory model of the factors and issues surrounding socio-technical secure 
system development provides a useful theoretical framework that can be used to analyse 
the reasons for the success or failure of a given socio-technical design method. This can 
be useful for future research as a means of evaluating other secure system design 
methodologies and identifying some of their strengths and weaknesses, together with 
proposing areas in which security design methodologies can be improved.  
 
In addition to helping to evaluate other methodologies, the factors identified in the model 
have implications for secure system design in general. Motivation and responsibility are 
two key aspects that extend beyond the scope of a design methodology. Specifically 
assigning  responsibility to individual stakeholders, or ensuring their motivation to 
address the security issues, is not in the power of a design methodology to enforce. 
However, it can be a strong recommendation that one of the first steps any security 
design exercise should take is to ensure the clear assignment of responsibility. This is 
necessary to ensure that everyone in the project knows who is in charge of security, and 
addresses the problem of diffusion of responsibility. A final point is that responsible 
stakeholders that do not have the authority to implement security decisions will 
encounter significant difficulties. As a consequence, responsibility must either be 
assigned to people who have authority (senior management for example), or authority 
must be given to those who are charged with security. 
 The assignment of responsibility also has an impact on the motivation of stakeholders 
– namely increasing it in those who are responsible for ensuring security. Maintaining 
the momentum and motivation for security can be a difficult task when faced with 
competing demands (e.g. functionality, cost, time-to-market), and the complexity of 
security design. An initial motivation for achieving security drives the desire to adopt a 
secure system design methodology. It is therefore important for security practice to 
understand the motives behind the need for security and address these. The motives can 
relate to legal requirements, fears of exposure to attack, or having valuable assets. Clearly 
addressing these underlying issues should be a key element of any security design 
methodologies if they are to keep in touch with the original motivation for security. 
Furthermore, the process of security design should be engaging, inclusive and 
understandable to all the participants in order to avoid discouragement. Motivational and 
organisation psychology are ideal fields of research from which further insight into these 
issues could be gained. 
 
The identification of anecdotes and scenarios in secure system design has more practical 
and immediate implications for security design in general. One of the key elements of 
any design exercise is ensuring the good communication of the participants. Security 
methods that adopt and support scenarios are much more in tune with the way people 
tend to communicate about security. As such they have a greater chance of being 
understandable, facilitating the clear communication between stakeholders. This is not 
to say that scenarios should be the only means of modelling or reasoning about security. 
Some of the weaknesses of scenarios are related to the difficulty in generalising their 
information content. That is to say that scenarios are highly specific descriptions of 
particular events in a system, whereas security needs have to encompass the system as a 
whole. Scenarios should therefore be used in conjunction with other security analysis 
techniques, as a particularly useful method for explaining security concepts and 
reasoning. 
Similarly, anecdotes used in security design discussions are not necessarily accurate or 
representative of the problem space. However, anecdotes have the benefit of being a 
persuasive source of security knowledge during these discussions. In the eyes of many, 
information related from anecdotes holds the advantage of having actually occurred, as 
opposed to being a theoretical possibility. Simply relying on anecdotes as the sole source 
of knowledge informing security design is risky and prone to error. However used in 
conjunction with other sources of knowledge, anecdotes have the benefit of being a 
useful source of information that can be easily communicated, understood and accepted 
by different stakeholders. 
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